The noradrenergic system is intimately related to the autonomic system, and it is thought to play a key role at the interface between arousal and cognition. The GANE theory proposes a complete account of that role, with an emphasis on the quantitative effect of noradrenaline on stimulus processing. This is in marked contrast with Network Reset, which emphasizes the qualitative effect of noradrenaline to update the representation of the environment.
In line with earlier theories of NA functions, GANE emphasizes the effect of NA on gain, which presumably mediates the inverted-U shaped relation between the efficacy of sensory-motor functions and arousal (Arnsten, 2009; Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005) .
Theories such as Network Reset or Unexpected Uncertainty are based on a very distinct intuition: the key role of the LC/NA system is to change internal representations, rather than enhancing them (Bouret and Sara, 2005; Yu and Dayan, 2005) . Network Reset is based on two features of the NA system: it is extremely well conserved across all vertebrates and its activation is systematically associated with a profound change in behavior (Bouret and Sara, 2004; Clayton et al, 2004; Dalley et al., 2001; Devauges and Sara, 1990; Jacobs, 1986; McGaughy et al, 2008) . The typical condition of LC activation is the orienting response to a salient stimulus (Aston-Jones and Bloom, 1981; Bouret and Sara, 2004; Foote et al., 1980) . Unexpected uncertainty is based on similar intuitions, and it emphasizes the role of NA in learning (Yu and Dayan, 2005) . Again, there are some differences between neurobiological intuitions proposed in GANE vs Network Reset but the key question raised by the authors is not 'how', but 'why': 'why phasic arousal induced when encountering emotional stimuli can enhance processing of preceding stimuli when they have high priority?' This implies two features: First, the processing of stimuli is taking enough time to allow subsequent emotional stimuli to induce an enhancement of this processing, via an increase in arousal. This assumption makes strong predictions upon the dynamics of these processes, and indeed this is important for understanding LC/NA functions. Second, it also implies that the processing of the original stimulus is not altered qualitatively by the emotional stimulus, it is only enhanced. In other words, the 'priority maps' are not modified qualitatively after the onset of this emotional stimulus, arousal is only enhancing their impact on behavior.
The assumptions behind Network reset were different: a salient stimulus would cause a qualitative change in stimulus processing, both the nature of the representation and the associated neuronal activity. The priority maps would be changed. In the extreme version of 'Network Reset', the highest priority would be attributed to the salient stimulus, and the preceding stimulus would be ignored. But if the initial stimulus leaves a trace strong enough to be integrated with the emotional one: after the reset, the new 'functional network' would underly the processing of both stimuli. In that case, the representation of the original stimulus would be modified (changed qualitatively), not quantitatively (enhanced or decreased).
Is the influence of arousing events qualitative (Network Reset) or quantitative (GANE)?
Using the example used in figure 7, these two theories make radically different predictions: According to Network Reset, the booming sound of thunderstorm would not enhance the processing of the cow, it would first trigger an orienting response, which consists both in interrupting existing activity (including processing of the cow), and promote redirection of attentional resources. Using the words of Mather et al, the sound would become 'high priority', but it might be combined with the cow in a novel representation. Importantly, the representation of the cow as it existed before the storm would have be gone.
Thus, we could rephrase the question raised by the authors: why salient stimulus should enhance processing of past event? First, time only goes one way, and modulating past events only makes sense if they are used for the present (James, 1913; Sara, 2000) . The example provided in figure 7 is very close to laboratory situations where discrete stimuli are manipulated in a controlled setting. But imagine yourself walking in the fields, and let's assume that for some reason you are considering the cow. What will happen if you hear a booming thunder, will you still care about the cow? If yes, what is the chance that you think about it the same way did before, independently from the critical information provided by the thunder? If the NA system had evolved to enhance the processing of the cow when a inherently significant stimulus occurs, would this system be so widely represented among living animal species?
In conclusion, besides its influence on the sensory-motor functions the LC/NA system has a major role in promoting changes in behavior. The details of the model, including its dynamics, will be critical to understand how, and why, the release of NA modulates forebrain systems. But this model should account for critical biological features of the LC: it is is activated when a behaviorally relevant stimulus triggers a sympathetic and a behavioral response. For all vertebrates, this autonomic activation is a generic emergency reaction that facilitates coping with a challenge (threat, effort, unexpected event etc), and it presumably facilitates the behavioral adjustment to the challenge. This adjustment may take several, including gain and/or reset, and be mediated by myriads of neurobiological processes, but to understand why the central NA system exists and what it does, it is important to consider ecological problems which the brain has evolved to solve.
